Quantifying Latin American firms'exposure to external factors by Sergio Pernice et al.
 
Quantifying Latin American firms’ exposure 




Analysis of Latin America's Corporations as a Rational Response to 





Sergio A. Pernice , Mariano Fernandez 




Universidad del CEMA 
Av. Córdoba 374 
(C1054AAP) Capital Federal 
Argentina 
 
                                                        
1 The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of 
the Universidad del CEMA.   2 
Abstract 
 
This is the last of a series of three working papers analyzing the basic characteristics of the 
economic environment in which Latin American firms operate and the optimal design of 
incentive programs compatible with such environment.  Executive pay-for-performance 
compensation schemes are usually based on stock returns.  However, stock returns change 
in response to forces beyond management control (e.g., market crushes). The economic 
environment in which Latin American firms operate is highly unstable, which means that 
this is a very important limitation for Latin American firms. 
 
In the present paper, we present a procedure to decompose variability in stock returns in 
order to identify and measure components that respond to external factors beyond 
management control. For this, we have created indices that capture statistically the 
external influences that affect stock returns. We show how such indices can be used to 
construct a risk profile that allows management to know to what extent observed outcomes 
depend on external factors, versus their own actions.  In addition, these indices can be used 
as a basis to develop "indexed options”: financial instruments designed to factor out the 
effects of external risks, making it possible for executives to be evaluated only on the basis 
of the value they generate.  We show that these indices can be developed out of purely local 
information, but that the solutions tend to be moderately unstable, which implies that 
compensation instruments developed with this methodology should be of relatively short 
maturity. 
   3 
Introduction 
 
When firms are public, stock value provides a key metric to evaluate top management 
performance.   Owners would like to have managers make decisions that increase stock 
value, making them wealthier
2.  Managers monitor stock price as a way to obtain feedback 
regarding the value creation implications of their decision-making.  In order to align 
incentives between managers and owners, executive compensation packages are structured 
with pay for performance schemes that in the case of public firms tend to depend on stock 
price. 
 
However, firm outcomes are a function of multiple factors, and the quality of top 
management decision-making is only one of those factors.  The value of stock can go up or 
down in response to management actions, but can also vary as a function of forces beyond 
management control such as changes in the economic cycle and many other external 
shocks. 
 
For example, in the United States, firms answered calls in the 1980s to tie compensation 
more closely to shareholder wealth with increased grants of executive stock options.  With 
the long bull market in the 1990s, stock options unfairly rewarded executives for the 
market’s success instead of their own contribution.  On the other side of this problem, the 
market crush of NASDAC in the 2000s produced stock price declines that left many 
executive stock options out-of-the-money, penalizing managers for negative outcomes 
caused by forces beyond their control
3. 
 
Any firm using stock value as a benchmark for pay for performance schemes among its 
executives will face this difficulty.  However, the problem is especially salient in Latin 
America.  In previous work
4 we have shown that Latin American firms face a highly 
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unstable economic environment.  This instability determines that more than 50% of the 
daily stock return variability of a typical company depends on factors beyond management 
control, compared to about 10-20% in the US.  This, in turn, implies that it is very difficult 
and costly to provide the right incentives to the firm executives. Since the stock return 
depends on so many external factors in Latin America, contracts that make executive 
compensation dependent on stock returns will loose their incentive effects. 
 
As we mentioned before, managers monitor stock price as a way to obtain feedback 
regarding the value creation implications of their decision-making. Given that Latin 
American firms face a highly unstable economic environment, it becomes very difficult for 
managers to determine if their actions either create or destroy firm value.   This is 
compounded by what is known in the behavioral finance literature as the self-attribution 
bias: people attribute successful outcomes to their own skill but blame unsuccessful 
outcomes on bad luck
5. This hobbles managers in two ways. First, managers cannot learn 
from mistakes because they will not see them as mistakes. Second, managers will assume 
they have been skilled or smart when they have just been lucky. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to present a procedure to decompose variability in stock 
returns in order to identify and measure components that respond to external factors beyond 
management control.   For pay for performance schemes, this allows the generation of  
"indexed options”: financial instruments designed to factor out the effects of external risks, 
making it possible for executives to be evaluated only on the basis of the value they 
generate.  These compensation contracts are beginning to be used in some American 
companies, and one of the authors (SP), in collaboration with Mercer Human Resources 
Consulting, recently developed the first indexed option executive compensation plan for a 
Latin American firm
6.  In order to develop indexed options, we need to create an index that 
captures as much as possible the external influences that affect stock returns. Then, the 
value of the compensation contract is made to depend on the difference between the value 
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of the stock and the value of a moving strike price that depends on this index. We dedicate 
this paper to set the basis for the construction of these indices for Latin American firms.  As 
we will show in the present work, such indices can also be used to analyze and measure the 
sources of external risk exposure faced by managers.  In other words, they allow us to 
construct a risk profile that indicates to what extent observed outcomes depend on external 
factors, versus management actions.  This constitutes objective feedback that should limit 
the scope of attribution problems. 
 
As demonstrated in our previous work
4, the macroeconomic environment prevalent in 
emerging countries during the nineties has been extremely unstable.  Recurring crises in 
emerging economies seem to affect other apparently unrelated emerging countries, which 
makes the macroeconomic environment very noisy.  But how exactly does this noise affect 
a specific given stock?  This question is of fundamental importance if we want to filter out 
such noise when analyzing the performance of a given stock. 
 
Before we continue, let us clearly state what do we mean by “filtering out the noise” on a 
given stock.  Suppose that the returns of the stock of a company i can be decomposed into 
external (to the firm) factors, and that ra, rb, rc, and rd are the returns of indices that we take 
as proxies for these factors, then we have the following regression equation: 
 
We interpret the portion of the returns of the stock i due to these factors as outside 
management control.  If we want to isolate only the portion of the stock return under 
management control, this is simply the part ei.  Therefore, “filtering out the noise” means: 
1) finding the right factors and their corresponding proxies; 2) calculating the 
corresponding bs; and 3) performing the following subtraction: 
 
The percentage of volatility explained by these factors gives us a measure of how much of 
the stock return is due to external factors.  This corresponds to the R
2 of the regression. 
, d 5 c 4 b 3 2 1 i a i r r r r r e b b b b b + + + + + =
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The problem of isolating the portion of a Latin American stock return that management can 
actually control appears then to be very difficult conceptually.  The stock of a company in 
an emerging country depends on the macroeconomic environment, and this environment in 
turn depends on external factors such as crises in other emerging countries.  Thus, in order 
to clean up the stock performance from all these external influences it would seem 
necessary to use an extremely complex combination of indices.  Each one of these indices 
would act as a proxy for a possible source of noise.  However, the nature of financial 
markets, in particular their "efficiency", induces us to search for ways to simplify this 
approach. 
 
The so-called “semi strong” form of market efficienc y claims that all publicly available 
information is rapidly reflected in the prices of securities.  But before working out the 
consequences of market efficiency for our problem at hand, we need to analyze if it really 
holds for our region.  In our previous work we have shown that, as measured by whatever 
standard parameter you may choose (e.g., market capitalization to GDP ratio, volatility, 
liquidity, concentration, etc.), Latin American equity capital markets are underdeveloped.  
How can we then simultaneously claim that they are nevertheless efficient?  The reason is 
that efficiency is a very robust notion.  Financial market efficiency requires only a few 
informed market makers and investors in order to work.   As reviewed in our previous 
work, the available studies on this subject, most of them unpublished, show that when 
transaction costs are taken into account, the behavior of Latin American financial markets 
is consistent with the concept of efficiency.   
 
What consequences can we draw from the efficiency of equity markets for our problem at 
hand?  In another words, what can we conclude from the fact that all publicly available 
information is rapidly reflected in the prices of securities?  Qualitatively we can anticipate 
that when an event such as a crisis in emerging country A occurs, and influences equity 
prices in another unrelated country B, it is likely that such effect will be rapidly reflected in 
country B's equity index.  Thus, if we want to filter out the effect of a crisis in country A on 
the stocks of country B, due to the efficiency of markets we will only need to take into   7 
account the effect of the crisis in country B’s equity index.  In other words, market 
efficiency allows us to simplify the problem of filtering out noise from a global problem 
involving global indices as proxies for global factors to a far simpler local problem where 
only local indices are considered.  In the present chapter we explore this possibility. 
 
Quantitatively the above arguments translate into the fact that if the markets are efficient, 
then the explanatory power (the R
2 of the regression) of local indices for the returns of 
stocks should not be significantly different from the explanatory power of a set of global 
indices.  We show in this chapter that this is indeed the case.  In the process, we develop a 
methodology that allows Latin American companies to have a clear picture of their risk 
profile.  That is, we are able to point out the sources of risk that affect a given company and 
how these sources change over time.  In addition, we show that in many cases, not only do 
the local indices have the same explanatory power than a set of global indices, but their 
coefficients are actually more stable through different time periods.  
 
This paper is organized as follows.  First, we develop a methodology to decompose the risk 
profile of Latin American companies into global, regional, country, and industry risks, and 
we present some examples that show the power of this methodology to detect the main 
sources of risk during periods of crisis.  Second, we test the capacity of local indices to 
capture the information contained in the global indices.  In a sense, this can be considered a 
test of market efficiency.  Consistently with efficiency, we show that local indices, 
including country and industry indices, do capture basically all the relevant information.  
This result is of great importance because it allows us to reduce the filtering problem from a 
global to a local one.  Third, we study the stability of the local solution of the filtering 
problem.  We find that, in general, the solutions are not very stable.  This is consistent with 
our conjecture that in emerging countries, and in particular in Latin American countries, the 
optimal incentive contract is shorter than in developed countries.  Fourth, we illustrate these 
three points with a set of tables that take a close look at a number of companies of interest.  
We conclude with a discussion of how the construction of these indices should be adapted 
in order to develop indexed stock options tailor made for a specific firm.  




We start with a global model.  In order to capture factors influencing the returns of a given 
stock with a small number of free parameters, we first study a model of the following form: 
 
 
In this regression model, ri,j refers to the daily returns of company i of country j.  rS&P500 
refers to daily returns of the S&P500 index, taken as a proxy for global influences over the 
considered stock.  rLat.Ind j, is a Latin American Index for country j.  It is constructed as 
follows: if j is, say, Brazil, then rLat.Ind j is the arithmetic average of the daily returns of the 
indices of the other Latin American countries considered (i.e., Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela).  Note that the index of Brazil is not considered in this index.  We 
also explored how the results change when a market capitalization weighted index is 
considered instead of the arithmetic average used here.  We found that the results basically 
do not change, which tells us that our results are robust.  The Latin American Index is 
meant to capture Latin American effects affecting the returns of company i,j.  The next 
index, rcountry j, is the local equity index (e.g., Bovespa for Brazil) meant to capture country 
specific effects.  rInd i,j is a local industry index constructed as the arithmetic average of the 
daily returns of companies of the same country and industry as the company considered that 
at the same time are sufficiently liquid.  Finally, ei,j refers to the component of the returns 
of company i,j that can not be explained by the previous factors.   This component is 
usually called firm specific and can be attributed to executive decision-making.  The 
solution of the filtering problem within this structure is then to find the coefficients b that 
best fit such equation for the historic values considered.  We use the standard least square 
methodology for this. 
 
A model like the one presented above is at the same time sufficiently general and 
manageable.  However, as it stands, is does not allow us to decompose the influences over 
the stock into unequivocal sources as required in order to construct a risk profile of the 
j i ij j j j i r r r r r ,   Ind 5 country  4   Lat.Ind 3 500 P & S 2 1 , e b b b b b + + + + + =  9 
company.   Mathematically, the reason is that the explanatory variables co-vary with each 
other.  But underlying these covariances are deep reasons that one should consider in order 
to understand the true meaning of a risk profile and act accordingly. 
 
We want to answer the question of what proportion of the stock volatility is due to global, 
regional, local and industry specific events.  But in the above regression model, the 
explanatory variables co-vary with each other and thus, we cannot isolate the proportion of 
stock volatility explained by each index.  We need to transform the above model into an 
equivalent model but with de-correlated variables.  The problem is that, although this point 
is technical, there are infinitely many ways to de-correlate variables.  Thus, which one 
should we choose? 
 
To select the right set of variables we were guided by the following observation: in general 
(but not always), emerging markets tend to be more influenced by global events than the 
other way around.  For example, a fall in the S&P500 will likely induce a fall in Bovespa 
but a fall in the Brazilian index will probably not even make a dent on the US index. The 















The direction of red
arrows is much more
likely than yellow arrows  10 
Based on this observation regarding the direction of influences between the variables of 
interest, we choose our de-correlated variables in the following way
7: 1) The global index 
remains unchanged. 2) We subtract from the regional index the variability already 
explained by the global index, obtaining in this way a regional index de-correlated to the 
global index.  3) We subtract from to the country index the variability already explained by 
the global and regional indices, creating a new country index de-correlated with the 
previous two indices. 4) We do a similar job with the industry index.  We illustrate the 






To a situation represented by: 
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replaced by a variable r*Ind i,j that is a linear combination of rS&P500, r*Lat.Ind j, r*country j  and rInd i,j simultaneously 
de-correlated with rS&P500,  r*Lat.Ind j and r*country j  (Corr (rS&P500, j, r*Ind i,j) = 0; Corr (r*Lat.Ind j, r*Ind i,j) = 0; Corr( 






The problem of Correlated
 Variables  11 
 
 
It is important to understand that in going from the original model of correlated variables to 
the new model of de-correlated variables, the explanatory power of the model (measured by 
its R
2) remains the same.  The only difference between results obtained with the new model 
versus the old one, is that now we are able to decompose the explained portion of the stock 
return of a company into global, regional, local and industry components.  In this way, we 
can construct an unambiguous risk profile of a company.  We should however interpret the 
results with care because we have in a sense imposed a cause-effect structure in our 
algorithm (from global, to regional, to local, etc.).  Although this generally corresponds to 
what we see in markets, it does not always work this way (for example, the Asian crisis did 
for a while affect global indices such as the S&P500). 
 
















      Emerging
      Country  Country  A
De-Correlated Variables
Country Firm Sector
Argentina YPF Oil and Energy
Brazil ITAU Bank Banking Sector
Compañía de Telefonos
CTC
México Bancomer Banking Sector
Chile Telecomunication









Note that the sub-periods are explicitly chosen to be the most volatile six-month long sub-
periods possible.  They correspond to one month before and five months after a given 















































Start Date End Date
Full Sample 02/07/93 13/02/02
Mexican Crisis 02/12/94 30/06/95
Asian Crisis 03/06/97 01/12/97
Russian Crisis 04/08/98 12/02/99
Brazil Crisis 01/12/98 30/06/99
Sample
Table 2   13 
The corresponding analyses for all the other companies studied are presented in a table at 
the end of this paper. 
 
Each graph compares, for the four companies in Table1, the risk profile of the full sample 
with the risk profile of the sub-period corresponding to the chosen crisis.  Note that in these 
graphs, the explained portion of volatility is normalized to 100% since the purpose of these 
graphs is to show the relative importance and changes in the explanatory variables. 
 
In the first graph, we see that the Mexican crisis affected the Argentinean, Brazilian and 
Chilean companies through the Latin index.  That is, this index increases its explanatory 
power during the crisis as compared with the full sample.  This is consistent with what we 
would expect intuitively, since the effects of the Mexican crisis remained always bounded 
to Latin America.  Interestingly, for the Mexican company, the effect was felt mostly as an 
industry effect, again the method gives the right answer since the Mexican company 
considered is a Bank and the Mexican crisis was essentially a Banking crisis.   
 
 
The second graph describes the effects of the Asian crisis.  Among all the emerging market 
crises of the nineties, this was definitely the most global, beginning in July of 1997 with the 
Bath devaluation and ending on October the 23rd with the run over the Hong Kong 
Decomposition of R Squared 

































Full Crisis Full Crisis Full Crisis Full Crisis
World Latin Country Industry
Argentina Mexico Chile Brazil  14 
currency.  The contagion to Latin America was then through the global markets.  Our 
methodology captures this by showing that it is the global index the one that increases the 
most its explanatory power in that period. 
 
 
The third graph shows the effects of the Russian crisis.  Although it did affect the global 
markets for a while its main contagion effects where bounded to emerging markets.  We see 
that our methodology captures this by showing that both the world and the regional indices 
increased their explanatory power. 
Decomposition of R Squared 




































Full Crisis Full Crisis Full Crisis Full Crisis
World Latin Country Industry
Argentina Mexico Chile Brazil  15 
 
Finally, the fourth graph shows the effects of the Brazilian crisis over the companies 
selected in Table 1.  Note that the Brazilian company gets affected mainly through its 
industry, again related to the fact that the chosen company is a bank.  For the Argentinean 
and Chilean companies, the effects came mainly through the country index since these two 
countries were relatively more affected by the Brazilian crisis than the rest of the Latin 
American countries considered in our regional index.  By the time of the Brazilian crisis, 
Mexico was already tied to the US through NAFTA.  That is why the effects for the 
Mexican company are better captured by the global index. 
Decomposition of R Squared 




































Full Crisis Full Crisis Full Crisis Full Crisis
World Latin Country Industry
Argentina Mexico Chile Brazil  16 
 
Overall, we note that for the companies studied, on average about 20 % of their explained 
volatility is due to global effects, about 30% is due to regional effects, about 47% is due to 
country effects, and only about 3% is due to industry effects.  This relatively low impact of 
the industry specific effects might indicate the market power of the companies considered. 
 
We conclude that our methodology reflects the impact of the crises as one would expect, 
and therefore the risk profiles it provides are probably an accurate picture of the influences 
the companies are subject to. 
 
 
Global vs. Local Models (or about market efficiency) 
 
Having developed a robust methodology for constructing the risk profile of Latin American 
companies, we now proceed to study to what extent purely local models are able to capture 
the information contained in the global model presented in the previous section.  As we 
have already discussed, contrary to intuition, if the markets are efficient the two models 
should be essentially equivalent.  The ultimate purpose of doing this exercise is to bind the 
Decomposition of R Squared 






































Full Crisis Full Crisis Full Crisis Full Crisis
World Latin Country Industry
Argentina Mexico Chile Brazil  17 
selection of companies to choose from to construct optimized indices for specific 
companies.  As we will see next, as expected from efficiency, local models capture 
essentially all the information contained in the global model, so we can already confirm 
that the construction of optimized indices becomes a manageable problem. 
 
We consider two local models and compare them to the global one of the previous section.  
The first one consist of simply a country index model: 
 




As a measure for the explanatory power of the models, we consider the corresponding R
2.  
Using daily data, we analyze the full sample mentioned in the previous section, plus the 
sub-periods corresponding to the crises.  For YPF, the Argentinean company, the results are 
the following: 
j i j j i r r , country  2 1 , e b b + + =
j i ij j j i r r r ,   Ind 3 country  2 1 , e b b b + + + =  18 
 
 
The graphs show that the explanatory power remains essentially the same when we 
compare between the global and local models, consistently with efficiency.  The lack of 
increased explanatory power of the industry index suggests that the company studied has 
considerable market power and is unaffected by industry events.  Note finally that an R
2 of 
55% is large by international standards.  Furthermore, the R
2 is even larger during periods 
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For ITAU, the Brazilian company, we note that the simplest country index model does 
loose some information but the model including the industry index captures essentially all 
the information contained in the global model.  Once again, local models are sufficient but 
in this case the data suggest that the banking industry in Brazil is not as monopolized as the 



















R Squared (C Index) (Country and Industry
Index)
Bovespa Industry Latin World Bovespa and 
Industry Index
 Capture the relevant


















R Squared (C Index) (Country and Industry
Index)




 Capture the relevant
















R Squared (C Index) (Country and Industry
Index)
Bovespa Industry Latin World
R2  0.50
B o vespa and 
I ndust r y I ndex
 Capture the relevant
















R Squared (C Index) (Country and Industry
Index)
Bovespa Industry Latin World
R2  0.75
B o vespa and 
I ndust r y I ndex
 Capture the relevant

















R Squared (C Index) (Country and Industry
Index)
Bovespa Industry Latin World
R
2 0.65
B o v espa and 
I ndust r y I ndex
 Capture the relevant
 set of market
 information  20 
 
 
The Chilean company CTC shows a behavior similar to the Argentinean company 
discussed before.  That is, the industry index does not contain additional explanatory power 
above the power contained in the country index.  64% of explained volatility for the full 
sample is really a large number, showing that CTC is extremely dependent on the 
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As in the Brazilian case, BCB Bancomer Bank of Mexico is subject to important influences 
from industry events, which suggest a competitive banking industry.  At the same time, 
66% of its volatility depends on factors beyond management control. 
 
We can derive three main points from these graphs.  First, as suggested in the introduction, 
large proportions of the volatility of Latin American firms depend on factors beyond their 
control.  Second, many of these factors are even beyond the particular country and are truly 
Mexico BCB Bancomer Bank 
 Market Efficiency
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global.  Third, from a practical point of view, due to the efficiency of capital markets, local 
indices capture basically all relevant information about the external influences, which 
simplifies a future search of optimized indices tailor made for specific companies.  The 
table at the end of this chapter confirms that these conclusions are general and do not 
depend on the particular companies studied in the above graphs. 
 
 
Stability of the beta coefficients 
 
In order to design indexed, equity-based incentive contracts, we need to know the stability 
of the indices used in these contracts.  In terms of our models, this means to study the 
stability of the beta parameters obtained from the regressions.   
 
The result of a regression analysis for the beta parameters is really a probability distribution 
on the values these parameters may take.  When we say, for example, that beta is 0.728, we 
are really saying that the best estimate of the probability distribution that the true beta can 
take is a Normal Distribution with a mean of 0.728.  The other parameter that fixes this 
distribution is its volatility or standard deviation.  In the graphs below, we study how these 
beta parameters change over the periods studied (again, for both the full sample and the 
crises periods).  We perform these analyses for the simplest local model as well as for the 
local model including an industry index.  The first number represents the best estimate of 
beta for the full sample, and the bars represent two standard deviations above and below 
this number.  The next four numbers represents the best estimate of beta plus/minus two 
standard deviations during the periods of time corresponding to the four crises studied.  It is 
important to know that the selection of these sub-periods during crises makes the observed 
betas probably the most varying possible.  To the extent that all the 2 standard deviation 
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First we show for YPF the results for the Country plus Industry Index Model: 
 
 
As we see the Beta Merval during de Russian Crisis changed significantly, on the other 
hand, the Beta Industry for YPF is consistent with zero in every period studied. 
 
The Betas of the Country Index Model for YPF for the different periods behave in a way 
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Full Mexico Asia Rusia Brazil
Beta ± ± 2 Stdev  24 
for the full sample is always smaller than the one for the sub-periods (this is simply due to 
having more data in the full sample).  
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It is evident that during the Brazilian Crisis the changes in both Beta Bovespa and Beta 
Industry have been dramatic. For the Bovespa alone we see below a more stable behavior 
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As we see below for Bancomer during the Mexican Crisis, Country and Industry Betas 
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The country model is more stable during the Mexican Crisis. 
 
 
Unfortunately, as the graphs above show, the beta parameters do change with time for both 
models.  This is specially the case in Brazil and Mexico.  But even in the other cases, betas 
vary significantly.  The problem with these variation is that if we fix the index for a given 
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compensation contract, it may become sub-optimal soon.  Therefore, we interpret these 
results as saying that the optimal contracts will have to have durations much shorter than 
the one presently used for stock options. 
 
Finally, in the table below, we find the data corresponding to 45 companies of the six Latin 




COUNTRY SECTOR FIRM PERIOD Const. Country Index Ind. Const. Country Index Ind.
1 Argentina Oil YPF Full Sample 0,001 0,720 -0,046 0,540 0,00056 0,02465 0,02202
2 Argentina Oil YPF Mexican Crisis 0,000 0,623 -0,049 0,692 0,00152 0,07747 0,06054
3 Argentina Oil YPF Asian Crisis 0,000 0,606 0,109 0,699 0,00121 0,07683 0,06463
4 Argentina Oil YPF Russian Crisis 0,000 0,993 -0,134 0,666 0,00264 0,12414 0,11990
5 Argentina Oil YPF Brazilian Crisis 0,000 0,886 -0,135 0,496 0,00264 0,13279 0,12221
6 Argentina Oil Sol Pet FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,987 -0,265 0,228 0,00130 0,08037 0,09181
7 Argentina Oil Pcom FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,830 0,017 0,738 0,00045 0,01856 0,01742
8 Argentina Foods Ledesma FULL SAMPLE 0,000 -0,042 0,583 0,294 0,00060 0,02292 0,01738
9 Argentina Foods Molinos FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,042 0,504 0,294 0,00064 0,02466 0,02013
10 Argentina Banks Bansud FULL SAMPLE -0,002 0,568 0,497 0,468 0,00143 0,09704 0,08944
11 Argentina Banks Frances FULL SAMPLE 0,001 0,756 0,439 0,781 0,00079 0,04821 0,04450
12 Argentina Banks Galicia FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,528 0,501 0,678 0,00090 0,05810 0,05235
13 Argentina Banks Río FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,577 0,317 0,581 0,00097 0,06200 0,05413
14 Argentina Banks Suquía FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,353 0,424 0,500 0,00103 0,06882 0,05927
15 Argentina Siderurgy Acindar FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,923 0,238 0,650 0,00047 0,02957 0,02267
16 Argentina Siderurgy Siderca FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,845 0,177 0,667 0,00041 0,02487 0,01687
17 ArgentinaTelecomunicationsTelefonica FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,315 0,422 0,488 0,00044 0,02687 0,02273
18 ArgentinaTelecomunications Telecom FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,720 0,305 0,676 0,00037 0,01818 0,01643
19 Argentina Beverages Quilmes FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,261 0,086 0,00076 0,02539
20 Brazil Banks ITAU Full Sample 0,000 0,386 0,356 0,423 0,00066 0,02995 0,03202
21 Brazil Banks ITAU Mexican Crisis 0,000 0,162 0,428 0,538 0,00221 0,08340 0,09886
22 Brazil Banks ITAU Asian Crisis 0,000 0,500 0,257 0,501 0,00283 0,10655 0,10470
23 Brazil Banks ITAU Russian Crisis 0,000 0,550 0,288 0,748 0,00312 0,13201 0,15995
24 Brazil Banks ITAU Brazilian Crisis 0,000 0,005 0,771 0,647 0,00242 0,10959 0,11208
25 Brazil Banks Banespa FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,514 0,377 0,269 0,00110 0,05157 0,05889
26 Brazil Banks Bradesco FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,576 0,298 0,521 0,00064 0,02810 0,03071
27 Brazil Banks Do Brazil FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,647 0,225 0,376 0,00087 0,03853 0,04268
28 Brazil Banks Unibanco FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,347 0,248 0,218 0,00087 0,04089 0,04293
29 Brazil Foods Sadia FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,542 0,303 0,00055 0,01572
30 Brazil Oil Petrobras FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,062 0,020 0,00101 0,02767
31 Brazil Beverages Ambev FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,763 0,027 0,497 0,00291 0,04707 0,03933
32 Brazil Beverages Antarctica FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,049 0,659 0,296 0,00396 0,07327 0,07254
33 Brazil Beverages Polar FULL SAMPLE 0,000 -0,169 0,811 0,201 0,00498 0,09895 0,10561
34 Brazil Mines V Rio Doce FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,518 0,102 0,275 0,00089 0,03189 0,02966
35 Brazil Mines Caemi FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,401 0,161 0,170 0,00106 0,04154 0,03707
36 Brazil Mines Magnesita FULL SAMPLE 0,000 0,409 0,118 0,168 0,00102 0,03868 0,03553
37 Chile Telecomunication CTC Full Sample 0,000 1,212 -0,058 0,633 0,00040 0,02505 0,01264
38 Chile Telecomunication CTC Mexican Crisis 0,000 1,030 0,047 0,647 0,00168 0,10362 0,06139
39 Chile Telecomunication CTC Asian Crisis 0,000 1,268 -0,012 0,661 0,00114 0,10255 0,07039
40 Chile Telecomunication CTC Russian Crisis 0,000 1,299 -0,067 0,753 0,00366 0,09547 0,03813
41 Chile Telecomunication CTC Brazilian Crisis 0,000 1,132 -0,187 0,616 0,00250 0,10123 0,05202
42 Chile Telecomunication ENTEL Full Sample 0,000 0,895 -0,001 0,310 0,00060 0,03923 0,02030
43 Chile Telecomunication Telex B Full Sample 0,000 0,689 0,028 0,045 0,00147 0,14580 0,11508
44 Mexico Banks Bancomer Full Sample 0,000 0,854 0,511 0,666 0,00083 0,05237 0,04424
45 Mexico Banks Bancomer Mexican Crisis 0,000 -0,053 1,363 0,701 0,01068 0,36603 0,28670
46 Mexico Banks Bancomer Asian Crisis 0,000 0,742 0,741 0,638 0,00284 0,18444 0,16567
47 Mexico Banks Bancomer Russian Crisis 0,000 1,140 0,548 0,705 0,00413 0,20344 0,14628
48 Mexico Banks Bancomer Brazilian Crisis 0,000 0,541 0,846 0,683 0,00028 0,19450 0,13720
49 México Banks Banorte Full Sample 0,000 0,600 0,392 0,510 0,00088 0,05849 0,04549
50 Mexico Banks INBursa Full Sample 0,000 0,568 0,126 0,466 0,00065 0,04227 0,02973
51 Mexico Banks Banamex Full Sample 0,000 0,713 0,523 0,645 0,00081 0,05203 0,04279
52 Colombia Banks B Bogota Full Sample 0,000 0,730 0,100 0,282 0,00121 0,06772 0,05882
Betas
R Squared
Standard Deviation  30 
 
 
The table should be read in the following way: consider for example the Brazilian company 
Ambev, all the numbers are self explanatory except the Industry Index numbers.  The 
industry index is an arithmetic average of the other two Brazilian companies of the 
beverages sector (Antarctica and Polar).  But we also studied these two companies on their 
own, so for Antarctica for example the Industry Index is the arithmetic average of the other 
two Brazilian companies of the beverages sector (Ambev and Polar).  The companies used 
to construct the Industry Index were selected as those among the industry that at the same 
time have reasonably liquid stocks.   The low R
2 of the Venezuelan companies is due to an 





The purpose of the present paper has been to present a procedure to decompose variability 
in stock returns in order to identify and measure components that respond to external 
factors beyond management control.  We started by setting up a procedure to capture, using 
standard regression models, the proportion of the stock volatility of a firm that is due to 
external factors.  We then showed how the explained portion of the stock return of a 
company can be decomposed into global, regional, local and industry components.  In this 
way, we constructed unambiguous risk profiles that not only tell us exactly to what extent 
external risk factors are responsible for observed variations in stock returns, but also 
measure the relative weights that global, regional, local and industry factors have in this 
regard.  A word of caution is required in order to interpret these results as we have imposed 
a cause-effect structure in our algorithm (from global, to regional, to local, etc.). 
COUNTRY SECTOR FIRM PERIOD Const. Country Index Ind. Const. Country Index Ind.
53 Colombia Banks B Colombia Full Sample 0,000 0,908 0,150 0,383 0,00120 0,06392 0,05971
54 Colombia Banks B Ganadero Full Sample 0,000 0,762 -0,186 0,226 0,00107 0,05765 0,04229
55 Colombia R Materials Argos Full Sample 0,000 1,325 0,078 0,658 0,00101 0,05059 0,02917
56 Colombia R Materials Caribe Full Sample 0,000 0,963 0,119 0,430 0,00130 0,08401 0,04834
57 Colombia Beverages Bavaria Full Sample 0,000 1,287 0,474 0,00041 0,03178
58 Venezuela Banks B Provincial Full Sample 0,000 0,337 0,121 0,277 0,00239 0,06704 0,06882
59 Venezuela Banks Corp Bancaria Full Sample 0,000 0,295 -0,150 0,022 0,00156 0,14496 0,14483
60 Venezuela Banks Mercantil Full Sample 0,000 0,808 0,217 0,246 0,00566 0,15708 0,19556
61 Venezuela Banks UniBanca Full Sample 0,000 0,561 0,097 0,112 0,00607 0,18001 0,21030
Betas R Squared Standard Deviation  31 
A risk profile with these characteristics can be very informative for managers.  It captures 
the impact that forces beyond their control have on stock returns.  In addition, the risk 
profile tells managers which of these external forces are more relevant for the dynamics of 
their business and how they change over time. 
 
Large proportions of the volatility of Latin American firms depend on factors beyond their 
control, and many of these factors are even beyond the particular country and are truly 
global.  However, we have shown that from a practical point of view, due to the efficiency 
of capital markets, local indices capture basically all relevant information about the external 
influences.  More precisely, standard local indices (i.e. Merval for Argentina, Bovespa for 
Brazil, etc.) plus industry indices capture essentially the same amount of information as a 
set of global, regional and local indices.  The importance of this result is that it shows that 
the set of relevant market information is contained in the stocks of local companies that 
conform such standard local indices.  This is consistent with the hypothesis of efficient 
capital markets.  But this does not mean that these standard indices are the best possible 
filtering devises.  It only means that the relevant information is there.  The best possible 
filtering devise for a specific firm would be a tailor made optimized index.  Such an 
optimized index -where the weight of each stock is itself the solution of an optimization 
problem- will do a better job at filtering out the noise.  We should regard the generic 
solutions presented here as a lower bound to the efficiency of the solutions of the filtering 
problem.   A key lesson then is that such optimized index should be constructed only out of 
local stocks. This finding gives us license to work with very simple models, which would 
be critically important when searching for optimized indices tailor made for specific firms.   
 
The final question we addressed concerned the stability of our solutions.  In order to design 
indexed, equity-based incentive contracts, we need to know how stable are the indices used 
in these contracts.  In terms of our models, this meant to evaluate the stability of the beta 
parameters obtained from the regressions.  Our analysis revealed that these beta parameters 
do change significantly with time.  The problem when these parameters are unstable is that 
an indexed option compensation contract may become sub-optimal soon.  Therefore, we 
interpreted these results as indication that optimal indexed option contracts should have   32 
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